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BUFFALO LAW REVIEW
the Legislature was not justified. The Attorney General, appearing in the
proceeding pursuant to Section 71 of the Executive Law,20 filed a general denial.
The same landlord had previously challenged the constitutionality of the
1955 re-enactment and extension 21 in Lincoln Building Associates v. Barr.22
There the court dismissed the petition but stated that rent controls have
justification only in periods of emergency and left open the question of how
long the Legislature may lawfully continue the office rent control. Subsequent to the Barr decision the Legislature effected a gradual relaxation of
controls by systematically reducing the amount of rent required to make office
space applicable for decontrol under the 1956 amendment.23
The Court of Appeals affirmed the order of the Municipal Court of the
City of New York,2 4 which had dismissed the petition, stating that petitioner's
evidence only showed that the intensity of the emergency ... "has moderated
to some extent but not in substantial degree."25 The Court noted that such
a process of gradual cessation of controls avoided economic disruption and
dislocation and held that such determination of the Legislature was not
arbitrary or a violation of constitutional guarantees. The dissenting opinion,
argued as it did in the Barr case, that the act in question was an excessive use
of the police power in an emergency, as defined by the United States Supreme
Court,2 6 and resulted in the violation of an individual's constitutional rights.
The dissent stressed that the emergency which gave rise to the act, namely
conditions of war, no longer existed, urging a distinction between conditions
caused by war and those resulting from a general prosperity in which both
tenants and landlords share.
It appears that the Business Rent Control Law will eventually disappear;
the decision indicating judicial approval of the legislative process of gradual
cessation of controls. Such a gradual process, the Court feels, is in line with
the stated purpose of the act "to protect and promote public health, safety
and general welfare."
DELEGATION OF POWER TO MUNICIPALITY TO TAX LiMTED

Article 3, Section 1 of the New York State Constitution confers on the
Legislature the exclusive power to levy taxes and to determine the class of
persons to be taxed provided such classification has a reasonable basis. The
20. N.Y. Executive Law § 71:
Whenever the constitutionality of a statute is brought into question . . . the
court or justice before whom such action or proceeding is pending may make an
order, directing the party desiring to raise such question to serve notice thereof on
the attorney-general and that the attorney-general be permitted to appear at
such trial or hearing in support of the constitutionality of such statute.
21. N.Y. Sess. Laws 1955, Chap. 701.
22. 1 N.Y.2d 413, 153 N.Y.S.2d 633 (1956).
23. N.Y. Sess. Laws 1956, ch. 735, §§ 2, 3.
24. 21 Misc. 2d 500, 196 N.Y.S.2d 241 (Mun. Ct. 1960).
25. Supra note 15 at 181, 203 N.Y.S.2d 87 (1960).
26. Levy Leasing Co. v. Siegel, 258 U.S. 242 (1922).
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Legislature, through enabling acts, may delegate a taxing power to its municipal sub-divisions and stipulate therein limitations on its application. Imposition of the resultant tax is unconstitutional if it exceeds the limited authority
conveyed by the enabling legislation.
Section 24(a) of the General City Law, as amended in 1947 and 1948,27
authorized municipalities, having populations of over one million people, to
impose a gross receipts tax upon persons making sales within that city or
engaged therein for profit or gain in any trade, business, profession, vocation
or commercial activity. The broad classification of "general business" can be
taxed at a rate not to exceed 1/5 of 1% of gross receipts. It also provides that
persons carrying on a "financial business" can be subjected to the higher rate
of 2/5 of 1%. "Financial business" is defined as: "the services and transaction
of private banks, private bankers, dealers and brokers in money, credits, commercial paper, bonds, notes, securities and stocks, monetary metals, factors
and commission merchants." 28
The distinction between the two classifications of tax-payers and the
respective maximum rates was the basis for the Court's decision in the matter
of United States Steel Corporationv. Gerosa, Comptroller of the City of New
York. United States Steel carried on operations as a holding company wholly
within the city. Its objection to the defendant's deficiency assessment 0 on
the gross receipts tax was founded upon its rejection of the comptroller's
determination that it was a "financial business." United States Steel alleged
that this classification was unconstitutional in that its application to the plaintiff's business in New York City exceeded the powers delegated to that City
by the enabling act.
The comptroller relied on a local law31 which added the term "holding
company" to the statutory definition of "financial business" set out in the
State enabling act. He assessed the plaintiff at the higher rate but apportioned
its gross receipts on the basis of 122 % to New York City. Both parties agreed
that the resultant tax was less than it would have been had the lower rate of
the "General Business" classification been applied to the total gross receipts
of the plaintiff.32 United States Steel denied, however, that it could be taxed
at either rate without an allocation, but the question of allocation was not
presented in the petition for review, which was transferred from the Supreme
Court to the Appellate Division33 where the tax determination was unanimously
affirmed.
27. N.Y. General City Law § 21.
28. Id. § 21(2).
29. 7 N.Y.2d 454, 199 N.Y.S.2d 457 (1959).
30. This assessment was made for the years 1948, 1949 and 1950 and embraced a
principle amount of $176,767.28 plus penalties and interest of $144,388.62.
31. New York City Administrative Code B46-1.0.
32. Without allocation, application of the "general business" rate would have
resulted in a principle tax of $808,379.91.
33. 7 A-D. 839, 182 N.Y.S.2d 299 (1st Dep't 1959).
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The Court of Appeals, in a five to two decision, annulled the determination,
stating that the classification of a "holding company" as a "financial business"
and the tax assessed by the defendant were unconstitutional and remitted the
matter to the comptroller for further proceedings.
Judge Dye, in the majority opinion, limited the scope of the Court's inquiry
to the narrow question of whether the plaintiff could be properly classified as
a "financial business." Looking to the definition in the enabling act, the Court
noted that it contained an enumeration of specific types of businesses, which
were preceded by the words "shall mean or include."'' This, it reasoned, was
indicative of a legislative intent to restrict the classification and to preclude
New York City from adding yet another business to this classification. The
expansion of that definition in the New York City local laws was an unauthorized expansion of the class definition set out in the enablement act and in
excess of the delegated powers to levy the instant tax on that basis.
Defendant argued that repeated re-enactment of the General City Laws
evinced a tacit approval by the Legislature of the defendant's then existant
practice of construing "financial business" to include holding companies. The
Court noted that while generally this does manifest a legislative favoring of
reasonable administrative interpretation,8 5 yet the legislative history of the act
would not countenance this interpretation of the leglislative will. The State
Legislature had resisted repeated efforts 3 6 by New York City to have the definition of "Financial Business" changed in its enablement, and seemed to have
manifested deliberateness in refusing to add "holding companies" to that definnition, by expressly including it in similar enabling acts for smaller municipalities. 37
Chief Judge Desmond, with Judge Burke concurring, agreed with the
majority in holding that the plaintiff was not a financial business." The minority
differed, however, with the Court's disposition of the case. They would have
upheld the tax on the premise that the "general business and financial taxes"
were one tax rather than two. They seemed to view the two classifications as
being in effect two faces on one and the same coin. They further declared that
the issue before them was not the validity of classification, which merely set
separate maximums for two kinds of business, but rather whether the single
tax authorized was validly levied.
Recalling the Court's previous stated policy of declaring the whole law on
the undisputed facts 38 the minority suggested that a wider scope of review was
called for. They noted that the instant tax, because of the comptroller's
34. Supra note 27.
35. Matter of Supock, 274 N.Y. 198, 9 N.E.2d 485 (1937). See also 110 A.L.R. 1158

(1937).

36. Assembly Int. No. 3519 and Senate Int. No. 3124, New York Legislative Record
and Index, 180th Session, 1957. See also Assembly Int. No. 3725 and Senate Int. No. 3186,
1958.
37. N.Y. Sess. Laws 1948, ch. 651.
38. Cahill v. Regan, 5 N.Y.2d 292, 184 N.YS.2d 348 (1959).
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decision to allocate the gross receipts, was actually less than it would have
been had the proper classification been applied to the receipts without allocation. This allocation by the comptroller, while lawful, was not required.
They held that the two classifications were relevant only in determining
the ceiling on the amount of the one tax which could be imposed. This dissenting opinion maintained that there was nothing to litigate unless the tax
had been improperly assessed in an amount in excess of that authorized by the
enabling legislation.39
The majority opinion indicated that where the classification is improper,
the constitutional question is reached and it refused to consider whether or not
the comptroller's determination could be upheld on the broader grounds introduced by the minority opinion.
The dissent cited the federal case of Lewis v. Reynolds,40 wherein a refund was claimed for a tax paid to the Internal Revenue Department. The fact
situation there arose out of a tax determination negating the petitioner's claim
of over-payment and the effect of the statute of limitations as a bar to a new
assessment. The minority noted that the refund there was denied because it
was held that even though no new assessment could be made after the statute
had run, the tax-payer, nevertheless, was not entitled to a refund because he
had failed to show that he had over-paid his tax. The analogy applicable to
the instant case is found in the plaintiff's failure to show that the comptroller
could not levy the tax without allocation.
To support this supposition that allocation was not required by the defendant, the minority noted the decision in Steinbeck v. Gerosa,41 which held
that even though the petitioner's business activities may induce or occasion
interstate commerce, the relationship must be a close and direct one to escape
the gross receipts tax. There the petitioner received royalties, from out of state
publishers under contracts negotiated in New York. That court held that the
payment did not directly result from interstate commerce.
The apparent analogy drawn by the dissent was that United States Steel,
as a holding company by the nature of its supervisory and financing role, was
doing business which was distinguishable from the direct operations of its
subsidiaries outside of the state. The likening of the petitioner and his publishers in the Steinbeck case as being more akin to a creditor and debtor than
to a partnership or joint venture seemed to suggest a further application of
this reasoning by the dissent to the holding company and its subsidiaries.
APPLICATION OF SECTIONS 86-A AND 87(2) OF THE Mum
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EXISTING CONTRACTS

In 1910, the Grove Hill Realty Co. sold and conveyed certain land to the
Femcliff Cemetery Association. The parties entered into an agreement wherein
39.

Nash v. Lynch, 253 N.Y. 564, 171 N.E. 784 (1930).

40.
41.

284 US. 281 (1931).

4 N.Y.2d 302, 175 N.Y.S.2d 1 (1958).
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